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Is EconomIcs a natural scIEncE?1
Julie a. nelson
AbstrAct: advocates of  a more socially responsible discipline of  economics often emphasize 
the purposive and unpredictable nature of  human economic behavior, contrasting this to the 
presumably deterministic behavior of  natural forces. this essay argues that such a distinction 
between “social” and “natural” sciences is in fact counterproductive, especially when issues of  
ecological sustainability are concerned. What is needed instead is a better notion of  science—
“science-with-wonder”—which grounds serious science in relational, non-newtonian thinking. 
Keywords: Economics; social science; natural science; Ecology
IntroductIon
many critics have decried the ability of  contemporary academic economics to 
address the urgent problems of  our day. From poverty, discrimination, and econom-
ic injustice to global climate change, nuclear proliferation, and corporate threats to 
national sovereignty, the issues facing our societies urgently require attention. Yet eco-
nomics education and research, currently dominated by the neoclassical approach, is 
very heavy on formal modeling and econometrics and very light on active empirical 
inquiry and social engagement. In its purest form, neoclassical economic theory in 
fact provides a theoretical justification for neoliberal policies of  total privatization and 
deregulation. some economists argue that social problems are best solved by simply giv-
ing markets and private self-interest free rein, and that the correctness of  this position 
is “proved” by mathematical models and theorems. By so emphasizing mathematical 
elegance and abstraction, contemporary economics tends to imply that no engagement 
with the gritty world or attention to human community life is necessary. 
Economists’ emphasis on mathematics arises from “physics-envy” and an ambition 
to be “scientific.” Hence, some critics argue that the field’s lack of  relevance and useful-
ness can be blamed on the idea that economics is or should be a science. these critics 
would like to clearly delineate economics, which they considered to be within the realm 
of  social philosophy, from physical science, which they imagine to be governed by very 
different rules of  natural philosophy. distinguished and broad-minded economist robert 
Heilbroner, for example, has argued strongly against “the increasing tendency to envi-
1. this article is a slightly revised version of  “Is Economics a natural science?” Social Research vol. 71, no. 
2, 2004, pp. 211-222. reproduced by permission.
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sion economics as a science” (1999, 317).
this essay questions such a position, on the grounds that it is based on a misun-
derstanding of  “science.” an understanding of  science that goes beyond the dualistic 
conception such critics employ would be more helpful in envisioning how the discipline 
of  economics can help address contemporary problems, and particularly those related 
to the natural environment.
macHInEs oR mEanIngs?
critics of  contemporary economics are correct inasmuch as they argue for reject-
ing the idea that economies can be modeled as mechanical and deterministic machines 
working according to given laws. It is, indeed, very important to challenge the economy-
as-machine idea. much argument against the idea that capitalism could become socially 
responsible is based on the idea that its direction is dictated by “laws” similar to those 
of  mechanical physics.  the “forces” of  profit maximization and competition, to use 
the neoclassical terms, are said to inexorably drive business leaders to maximize share-
holder value, no matter what the cost to workers’ well-being or the environment. or the 
“law” of  accumulation, to use the marxist term, is said to drive capitalist economies. 
the course of  economies, these models imply, is thus fundamentally out of  the hands of  
people and the institutions we create. If  a capitalist economy is an inexorable machine, 
then the only options are either to submit to it or dismantle it. I agree with the rejection 
of  this metaphor. a socially responsible economics must go beyond this image and these 
options. It must challenge this mechanistic image of  economies if  it is to bring back in 
a role for human purposive and creative action (nelson, forthcoming). 
critics go down the wrong track, however, when they characterize science as being 
about uncovering the “laws” of  nature and draw a dividing line between natural science 
and economics at the existence of  human volition. Human nature and human behavior 
are more unpredictable and subtle than the motions of  the particles of  physics, they 
often argue. natural science deals with predictable law-abiding behavior of  unconscious 
particles; economics deals with unpredictable social behavior of  conscious humans. In 
drawing such a line, they draw on intellectual habits of  using dualisms such as culture 
vs. nature, mind vs. body, human vs. animal, and freedom vs. determinism which have 
a long history in post-Enlightenment Western thought—and which this journal has set 
out to explore and challenge. 
Historians of  science tell us that at the time of  the Enlightenment in Europe a deep 
shift in worldview came about. In the medieval worldview, reason and the individual 
were relatively unimportant: obligations to the church and feudal hierarchies came first. 
time was structured with religious rituals of  syncretistic origin that marked the har-
mony of  human culture with the with the cycles of  nature, celebrating the arrival of  
spring, the solstice, the harvest, and the equinox. Humans were perceived as deeply 
embedded in a larger divine, social, and natural order.
the Enlightenment and the rise of  science brought a radically new idea: the think-
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ing individual and the scientist could rise above and control nature. reason, conscious-
ness, choice, and the human individual moved to the center of  the worldview, while 
spirituality, habitual behavior, obligation, and animal and physical nature moved to the 
margins. science became identified with reason, logic, detachment (and masculinity), 
contrasted to what was now seen in retrospect as an old-fashioned medieval view char-
acterized by emotion, superstition, submersion in nature (and femininity—see Harding 
1986, E.F. Keller 1985).
the problem with a dualistic worldview, however, is that it create gaps that are inev-
itably difficult to jump over or consistently bridge. If  the world runs by logic and equa-
tions, why do we think we find meaning in it? If  economies are deterministic machines, 
how can human purpose have any effect? If  human bodies (including brains) obey the 
laws of  animal nature, how is it that humans are distinguished by free minds? If  the 
world is mechanical, how can it also be moral and valuable? 
the early Enlightenment thinkers resolved this last problem by positing a divine 
origin for this finely ordered creation: the big machine we are all in, they claimed, car-
ries out god’s purpose and that is what makes it wonderful and meaningful. this image, 
however, became increasingly untenable over time as—especially after darwin—peo-
ple noticed that the study of  the “clockwork” could run along just fine without recourse 
to a “clockmaker.” darwinian thought, in its later developments, also much compli-
cated the Enlightenment notion of  the scientist-studying-passive-nature by raising the 
idea that evolution—not the insertion by the divine of  a rational essence into a material 
body—created the very mind of  the scientist. 
some thinkers have, of  course, tried to get around dualistic (e.g., mind vs. body, 
meaning vs. mechanism) thinking by attempting to jump completely to one side (and/) 
or the other. thoroughly reductionist notions of  science claim that the world really is 
all determinism and natural laws: our sense of  purpose, choice, and meaning is merely 
an epiphenomenal illusion—a trick of  nature in the service of  blind evolutionary proc-
esses. all sense of  wonder is denied. 
contemporary neoclassical economics, with its central image of  (rather agency-free) 
agents who follow laws of  mathematical maximization, at its fundamentals falls largely 
into this camp. the more an economic issue—exchange rates, poverty, pollution, what-
ever—can be wrung out and dried, stripped of  real-world content and context, drained 
of  emotive salience and addressed without apparent purposive intent, the more “scien-
tific” and high-status one’s research appears. the idea that high mathematical theory 
might sometime be applied to a real-world problem is given a sentence or two in the 
grant proposal or in the conclusion to a paper, but the real game is in the mathematics 
itself. technique has taken precedent over content or consequences. the underlying, 
unstated philosophy behind this towering accumulation of  mathematical modeling, of  
course, is that the world is such that it is amenable to such mathematical modeling: that 
it runs according to strict logic and laws describable by abstract functions.
In the opposite camp are romantic thinkers, to whom the world is really all about 
spirit, poetry, aesthetics, freedom, or the like. the anti-intellectuals in this group include 
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creationists who reject darwinian theory because it contradicts the biblical Book of  
genesis. given a choice between what we can learn from physical anthropology and 
what we are told by (rather medieval) religious dogma, they choose dogma. the intel-
lectuals in the group include the poets and artists and writers who continually look for 
meaning (or angst about its lack) in literature and art while regarding science as a rather 
pedestrian and unimaginative affair. 
Yet, in an important way, neoclassical economics can be classified in this group, 
too—as profoundly romantic as well as profoundly reductionist. defining economics as 
the study of  rational choice, neoclassical economics treats human physical bodies, their 
needs, and their evolved actual psychology of  thought and action as rather irrelevant. 
the notion that humans are created as rational decision-makers is, from a physical 
anthropology point of  view, just as ludicrous as the notion that humans were created on 
the sixth day. the notion of  humans as disembodied minds following rules of  complete-
ness, transitivity and independence of  irrelevant alternatives is romantic through and 
through (Kahneman 2003).
most people muddle through, one way or another, combining naïve dualism, reduc-
tionism and romanticism while trying not to think of  the philosophy behind their beliefs 
overly much. a person who is a thoroughly detached reductionist at work will be thor-
oughly emotionally attached to her three-year-old child. the romantic poet is glad that 
the person who works on his car pays attention to newtonian mechanics. the christian 
will feel that god works in spiritual ways, and not pay too much attention to the part 
of  her creed that says “I believe in the resurrection of  the body.” the neoclassical 
economist applies reductionist techniques to romantic notions, and, typically, washes 
his hands of  social responsibility while in a professional role. We deal with the split 
between nature perceived as mechanical, and our own lives perceived as meaningful, 
mostly by not thinking about it too much.
a BEttEr notIon oF scIEncE
those who argue that economics should not be thought of  as a science, however, 
are reacting against a rather dated image of  what the natural sciences are about. more 
recent work in physics demonstrates that the natural world is not through-and-through 
the billiard-ball universe envisioned in the newtonian model. that model does a good 
job of  explaining physical phenomena on the scale we observe with our unaided abili-
ties of  human perception. Wheels, levers and billiard balls will move as predicted by 
newtonian equations. However, in the centuries since newton, when scientists have 
examined phenomena that are much bigger (e.g., in astronomy) or much smaller (e.g. 
in particle physics), the image of  the natural world as a mechanical and deterministic 
machine has been shown to be inadequate. study of  black holes, quantum mechanics, 
and complexity bring in elements that cannot be explained with mechanical notions. 
Energies, interrelations, a large role for randomness, and fundamental unpredictability 
are now recognized as important parts of  the nature of  “nature.” 
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In contrast to an image of  science as about the uncovering of  the laws and rules 
governing a passive and mechanistic nature, there has long existed an alternative image. 
this is the idea of  science as a purposeful enterprise, motivated at its base by both a 
curiosity about the world and a desire to solve problems at hand. the essence of  such a 
science is skepticism and an absence of  dogma—even, when the case demands, about 
the dogma that the world must be seen as strictly ordered by deterministic natural laws. 
this kind of  science demands a questioning attitude, creative thought, an open mind, 
a habit of  returning again and again to observation, a capacity to maintain attention 
to detail, a willingness to tolerate and investigate the “outlier” cases, the patience to 
methodically investigate alternative explanations, and the sense to notice how one’s 
knowledge changes the world. a common element in the work of  those who pursue 
such a science is an idea of  the world as made up of  evolving processes and their intri-
cate interrelationships, instead of  as fundamentally made of  billiard-ball-type units.2 
scIEncE-WItH-WondEr
While it is possible to fall into reductionist, romantic, or dualist traps even when 
one starts with such a notion of  science—these being the dominant cultural ways of  
understanding the world, it would be odd if  many didn’t follow these temptations—I 
believe that such a notion, consistently held, opens up a radically different alternative 
that transcends these unsatisfactory positions.
this might be called “science-with-wonder.” It is thoroughly grounded in obser-
vation and investigation, without the least patience for dogma, superstition or deus ex 
machina explanations. But the very observations and investigations that inspire it also, by 
bringing the scientist face to face with the intricate interrelationships underlying phe-
nomena, inspire awe and wonder, and a sense of  value. the sense of  value, in turn, can 
inspire responsibility and compassion. 
I have noticed this sense in the work of  a number of  contemporary scientists. For 
example, evolutionary biologist richard dawkins said in his lecture, “science, delusion 
and the appetite for Wonder,”
there is an appetite for wonder, and isn’t true science well qualified to feed it?
It’s often said that people ‘need’ something more in their lives than just the material 
world. there is a gap that must be filled. People need to feel a sense of  purpose. 
Well, not a Bad purpose would be to find out what is already here, in the material 
world, before concluding that you need something more. How much more do you 
want? Just study what is, and you’ll find that it already is far more uplifting than 
2. this sense of  the world being composed of  processes rather than substances was important, for example, 
in the american Pragmatist philosophy of  William James and John dewey in the early 20th century. While 
most of  their work was confined to applying this insight to the social sphere, the early 20th century phi-
losophy of  alfred north Whitehead and the contemporary physics of  Ilya Prigogine and Isabel stengers 
(1997) extend it to the physical dimension as well. (For more on application of  these insights to economics, 
see nelson 2003).
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anything you could imagine needing. (1996)
While people may disagree about dawkin’s notions of  the “selfish gene” and “memes,” 
the sort of  science he talks about is neither desiccated (as a reductionist’s would be) nor 
at some level of  mental existence above the phenomenal plane (as a romantic’s would 
be).
or consider gerald Edelman and giulio tononi, who have studied at great length 
the relationship between the brain and the mind—between the material world and 
consciousness:
[c]onscious thought is a set of  relations with a meaning that goes beyond just 
energy or matter (although it involves both)…[t]he mind…is both material and 
meaningful…there are no completely separate domains of  matter and mind 
and no grounds for dualism…It is the amazingly complex material structures of  
the nervous system and body that give rise to dynamic mental processes and to 
meaning. (2000, p. 219)
or consider the words of  1983 nobel laureate cytogeneticist Barbara mcclintock, who 
said, “I start with a seedling, and I don’t want to leave it...so I know every plant in the 
field. I know them intimately, and I find it a great pleasure to know them… Plants are 
extraordinary” (quoted in E. F. Keller 1983, pp. 198-99). or consider this little insight 
into the view of  psychologist daniel Kahneman, who received the Prize in Economics 
sciences in memory of  alfred nobel in 2002 for his work on the actual psychologi-
cal bases of  perception and choice: “However, this marvelous creation [the human 
cognitive system] differs in important respects from…the rational agent assumed in 
economic theory” (2003, p. 1454).
notice the value-laden adjectives in these descriptions—“uplifting,” “amaz-
ing,” “extraordinary,” and “marvelous.” science-with-wonder studies and appreci-
ates phenomena at the same time. In fact, the deeper is the study, the deeper is the 
appreciation.
such a non-dualistic view of  matter and meaning, however, is terribly hard to hold 
on to, given dominant cultural understandings—and even the way our language is 
structured. For example, one term used to describe a project such as Edelman and 
tononi’s is that they are seeking to “naturalize” consciousness—that is, to describe the 
mind as arising from material causes without recourse to alternative (purely mental or 
spiritual) substances. However, if  you look up the definition of  “to naturalize” in the 
oxford English dictionary, you find: “naturalize (7. b.) to reduce to a purely natural 
basis; to free from the supernatural or miraculous.” In a sense this is correct—deus ex 
machina appeals to the supernatural are, as previously stated, not acceptable. But in 
another sense, the definition leans much too far towards a reductionist interpretation. 
In an important way, what dawkins, Edelman and tononi, mcclintock, Kahneman 
and others are saying is that nature itself  is all “miraculous.” It is amazing, marvelous, 
uplifting, extraordinary, and valuable. 
this sense of  wonder is one we can all touch, if  we pause for a moment to perceive, 
as a child would, that we somehow exist, in bodies and space and time and relation-
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ships, in a way over which we have no control and which we can hardly hope to begin 
to understand. this sense of  awe at just being is also likely at the base of  our human 
spiritual impulses, although it has very little to do with any particular religious dogma 
or creed. at such a moment of  wonder at all of  existence, the material and the spir-
itual—the sense of  being in a body and the sense of  being part of  something large and 
precious—are one and the same.
EconomIcs-WItH-WondEr
How could this different notion of  science help us create a more healthy, just, and 
sustainable economic world?
First, science-with-wonder challenges the mechanistic notions of  a socially amoral 
capitalism at a very basic level. Without such a challenge to dualistic conceptions of  
science versus meaning, the critics’ project can be relegated, by conventional thinkers, 
to the realm of  “socio-economics”—perceived and portrayed as a sort of  soft-headed, 
touchy-feely (read: feminine) area—while mathematical modelers keep the academic 
high ground of  being (read: masculine) “scientific economists.” the basic dualistic 
image of  purposeful humans versus a grinding, profit-maximizing mechanical capital-
ism would remain untouched. 
second, a notion of  science-with-wonder could help transform economics back into 
a useful endeavor by shifting its focus from technique back to content and consequenc-
es. techniques such as mathematical modeling and econometric hypothesis testing are 
not “wrong.” In fact they can sometimes be quite useful. But a habit of  excessively 
and reductionistically focusing on an extremely narrowly-defined set of  techniques is 
detrimental. It takes our attention away from the phenomenon we purport to study, 
rather than leading us further into it. science-with-wonder is motivated by a sense of  
curiosity and concern, leading to a desire to carefully investigate and deeply understand 
the subject matter. the best economists I have known exemplify this approach. most 
economists I have known, unfortunately, seem to be more motivated by personal profes-
sional ambition. given the current state of  the profession, this is most quickly satisfied 
by proving oneself  clever at mathematical manipulation using accepted (though errone-
ous) models of  human behavior.
third, science-with-wonder adds particular insight to the issues of  human relation-
ships with the rest of  the natural world. an Enlightenment approach, of  course, would 
state this as “human relationships with the natural world” since humans in that view 
are portrayed as somehow apart from and above our bodies—divinely or romantically 
blessed with a gift of  reason and consciousness found, presumably, nowhere else in 
nature. science-with-wonder does not deny the existence of  our amazing capacity for 
consciousness, but grounds this as part of  a continuum of  processes of nature, rather 
than portraying it as a hard wall separating us from nature. there is an incredible hubris 
in science-without-wonder approaches that see human inventiveness and technological 
advance as the way to solve environmental problems. “It doesn’t really matter how 
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much we deplete the ozone or warm up the climate,” such reasoning suggests, “because 
we have faith that in the future we will be able to think our way out of  any problem we 
create now.”  there is also a rather scary variety of  wonder-without-science that sug-
gests that ecological collapse is part of  an inescapable divine plan for end times salva-
tion, and therefore also need not be prevented (c. Keller, 1996). to the extent we, first, 
separate mind from matter (or spirit from matter) and, second, then identify with mind 
(or spirit), the result is that matter appears to not be particularly relevant, or at least not 
particularly our responsibility.3
conclusIon
the problem is not that economic life is too closely associated with the natural 
world. on the contrary, what we need to develop is precisely our capacity to identify 
ourselves as integrally a part of  nature. We need to leave behind the notion of  ourselves 
as minds (or spirits) somehow above and apart from nature, and see material and eco-
logical concerns as very much our affair, and very much our own responsibility. to do 
this, the notion of  science as the study of  mechanism must be left behind. the study 
of  social behavior, including economic behavior, must become “naturalized” (in the 
simultaneously “miraculous” sense). 
Economics is, in short, a natural science. a biologist in awe at the complexity of  
a coral reef  is unlikely to carelessly toss his or her styrofoam cup into the ocean. one 
can hope that economists who are able, though deep and careful observation and open 
minds, to develop a sense of  awe at the complexity of  the interplay of  human social 
organization with the bodily basis of  existence will be similarly inspired to protect and 
preserve it.
Julie a. nelson 
global development and Environment Institute 
tufts university
3. Because the term “nature” has become so closely associated with “natural law,” I must reiterate that I am 
using the term to refer to amazingly complex evolving processes that span dimensions we might commonly 
try to separate out as material, mental, and spiritual. In no way do I mean that there is some substantive, 
given, unchanging nature out there for us to simply discover. my position is quite consistent with a social 
constructivist understanding of  knowledge and identity. In fact, if  you start with the recognition that as 
human organisms our knowledge and our very means of  knowing and perceiving have been dynamically 
shaped in conjunction with specific environments and needs, you cannot avoid the conclusion that a great 
deal of  what we think we “know” about the world is knower-dependent and highly contingent. However, I 
also reject strongly subjective versions of  social constructionism and the literary turn in Pragmatism, since 
these seem to me to fall back into mind/body dualistic traps by neglecting bodily experience.
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